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The combination of programmatic policy-based assistance and TA support provided under this initiative proved to be effective and should be continued. The lack of qualified and experienced local consultants had been a recurring issue, and the Ministry of Health (MOH), the executing agency, continued to face a shortage of sanctioned staff. By giving consultant support to key departments of MOH, the TA contributed to knowledge transfer and capacity building for these departments, and to stronger coordination across the MOH and other ministries.

Effective implementation of system reforms, given their long-term horizon, requires phased support from development partners. The multiple tranche arrangement employed by this program ensured satisfactory progression as a precondition for continued ADB assistance and strengthened the government’s accountability for the reforms.

The policy actions pursued under this program were developed in an open, participatory manner.  They were fully aligned with the country’s Health Sector Reform Strategy and Health Sector Development Plan.  The participatory development and full alignment of the reform program with the country sector strategy and development plan ensured strong and broad ownership and commitment from the government, and with the assistance of development partners, strengthened policy dialogue and coordination.

Enhanced human development is a core strategy in the Vision 2030 of the government of Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) to achieve innovative, green, and sustainable growth, in line with which it has implemented the Health Sector Reform Strategy (HSRS), 2013–2025.  The HSRS aims to improve access to basic health care and financial protection by 2020 and universal health coverage (UHC) by 2025 through more efficient use of public resources and expanded health financing. It is being carried out in three phases through the five-year Health Sector Development Plans (HSDP) (2013–2015; 2016–2020; and 2021–2025).

The Health Sector Governance Program (HSGP), approved by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for a $17 million policy-based loan (PBL) in September 2015, was designed to directly support the implementation of the HSRS through the 7th HSDP, 2013–2015 and 8th HSDP, 2016–2020. Along with the PBL, ADB also approved a $6 million technical assistance (TA) loan for the HSGP and subsequently approved a $30 million grant for subprogram 2 in April 2018.

Building on earlier ADB projects, which focused on infrastructure and staff capacity development in selected provinces and helped to improve the health facility network and access to health services in these areas, the HSGP supported key system reforms in governance, health human resources, and public financial management to generate a broader impact on system performance.  It targeted the key binding constraints on health system development in Lao PDR on both the supply and demand sides

HSGP’s envisaged impact of achieving UHC by 2025 was aligned with the country’s 8th National Socio-Economic Development Plan, 2016–2020.  Its expected outcome was improved health service delivery, particularly for the poor, women, and children. The impact and outcome were to be delivered through the following outputs: (i) health sector reform process improved; (ii) improved delivery of free health services for maternal, neonatal, and child health (MNCH) and for the poor under the national health insurance (NHI) scheme; (iii) health human resources management capacity strengthened; and (iv) health sector financial management capacity strengthened. The planned outputs were to be achieved through 15 policy actions under subprogram 1 and 17 policy actions under subprogram 2. The World Bank provided parallel, collaborative cofinancing for subprogram 1, comprising a $13.2 million loan and a $13.2 million grant.  Besides the TA loan, ADB also mobilized a $2 million capacity development TA grant from the Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction.

Minor changes were made to the program design during implementation and all output indicators or key policy actions were achieved.  The health sector reform process was institutionalized under a robust set of policies and road maps. The coverage of social health protection schemes was expanded, and their management was strengthened through the integration of the NHI, the Health Equity Fund, and the free MNCU schemes. Legal and planning frameworks, including quality assurance measures, were put in place to improve health human resources management practices. Trainings and scholarships were provided to strengthen the capacities of health professionals and allied personnel.  Preparation of a multi-year rolling plan framework was supported to strengthen financial management by the Ministry of Health (MOH) and so were the development of an Accounting Law and guidelines on the collection, accounting, and utilization of service charges by publicly owned health facilities; the adoption of a quarterly budget and expenditure monitoring system at central, provincial, district, and health office levels; and the regular publication of the National Health Accounts report.

Program output deliveries led to the attainment of all 4 outcome targets – 3 exceeding expectations and 1 substantially achieved. Specifically, the program helped the MOH achieve 87% NHI coverage among the general population and 100% coverage for the poor, exceeding the 80% target for both. It also helped to equip health centers, the lowest level in the health service delivery system, with essential health staff. By 2019, against a target of 80%, 85.4% of all health centers had at least one midwife, resulting in the increase in free facility-based delivery rate from a baseline of 25.5% in 2015 to 78% of all deliveries in 2019. The slight shortfall in the 80% target would have been exceeded if central hospital deliveries had been included.

Overall, the program thus contributed to the government’s goal to achieve UHC by 2025. It had the MOH as executing agency.  Implementation was delegated to the relevant departments.

Incorporating utility shifting as part of the item-rate contract proved to be effective in the timely delivery of projects in some states of India. In road construction projects, the task of utility shifting is usually contracted out to a third-party entity specialized in utility shifting. However, contractors often utilize or abuse this arrangement as an excuse to delay civil works. To prevent such an occurrence, it may be necessary for utility shifting to be included in the bill of quantity items to be carried out by the contractor.

Some of this project’s initial delays can also be attributed to the need to revise the DPRs because of discrepancies or deficiencies in design, specifications, and quantities. For example, mismatches in the number of culverts and bridges relative to site conditions were found during project implementation.  Additional requirements, including four lanes in urban or habituated sections, were included late in the project, requiring the issuance of variations.  Further, because a wildlife sanctuary clearance was not obtained, one road was dropped from the project. In future, EAs should ensure that DPRs are more meticulously prepared to accord with the site requirements. Also importantly, that the required environmental clearances are obtained during DPR preparation.

Following the request made by the state public works department through the national government of India, this project was prepared for approval well ahead of the schedule proposed in the country operations business plan. The construction supervision consultants were recruited under ADB’s advance action facility, about 10 months before the start of loan negotiations. However, grounding the project took longer than anticipated. The benefits of advance contracting could not be realized because the EA was short of staff to undertake procurement-related tasks, and contract awards started only in quarter 1 of 2015, or three years after loan approval.  This undermined the advance action’s intention to facilitate timely startup and completion. Especially for sector loan projects with multiple subprojects and contracts, such as this one, it is important that EAs/IAs have an adequate number of skilled procurement staff to ensure project readiness at loan approval and maximize the benefits of advance action.

Chhattisgarh in central India was established in November 2000 through bifurcation, having separated from the state of Madhya Pradesh. At establishment, the state faced serious challenges related to deficient physical and social infrastructure and required a good intrastate road network to complement the existing National Highways network. Most roads had only single or intermediate lane and lacked the capacity to cope with increasing traffic. Moreover, road conditions were poor, leading to reduced usability in the rainy season. In 2003, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided the first loan of $180 million to improve 1,250 kilometers (km) of state roads in Chhattisgarh, and technical assistance (TA) support to reform the state roads sector. The project was successfully implemented and completed in July 2011.

However, following the loan, substantial sections of the state highways and major district roads (MDRs) in the state remained in poor condition and unusable during the rainy season. To further improve the state road network, the Chhattisgarh Public Works Department (CGPWD) sought further ADB assistance through the government of India. In response, ADB approved a $300 million loan for the Chhattisgarh State Road Sector Project in December 2012, well ahead of the schedule proposed in the country operations business plan. The advanced approval was based on the high level of project readiness achieved at project preparation stage, including: (i) the completed detailed design of all sample roads and proposed non-sample roads and (ii) strengthened capacity of CGPWD through an earlier ADB TA.

The project’s envisaged impact was improved connectivity in Chhattisgarh. Its expected outcome was an improved road transport system in the state. Its planned outputs were: (i) state roads reconstructed and rehabilitated; (ii) improved capacity of the CGPWD in procurement, contract management, and project management; and (iii) a road asset management system (RAMS) established. To facilitate these objectives, ADB also approved $1 million capacity development TA attached to the loan.

While some technical designs were adjusted to actual ground conditions, the project scope was not changed during implementation. At completion, it achieved or substantially achieved all its output targets.  By 2019, it had reconstructed and rehabilitated 852.97 km of state roads to the standard two-lane, 7 meter (m)-wide carriageways, against a target of 916 km by 2017. It trained 1,253 of the 1,385 CGPWD staff in procurement, contract management, and project management, increasing by 56%, against a target of 50%, the CGPWD staff trained in the foregoing areas of work. The RAMS established through the Public Works Department management information system has been operational since 2017, and the database on road assets was completed in 2019.

The project’s output deliveries improved the state’s road transport system. Although with some delays, all three outcome targets were thus achieved as indicated by the following: (i) the movement of people and goods on roads constructed and/or rehabilitated increased from a daily average of 910,000 vehicle-km in 2011 to 4,798,300 vehicle-km in 2019; (ii) average travel time on project roads decreased by about 37% in 2019 from its 2011 level; and (iii) vehicle operating costs (VOCs) on the project roads decreased by 24.7% for cars and by 24.6% for medium trucks.

The project consequently achieved its envisaged impact. The increased inter-district connectivity and efficient and sustainable state road transport operations that resulted from the project helped spur a significant socioeconomic improvement in Chhattisgarh, with the people enjoying greater access to markets, health, and educational facilities. Girls particularly can reach school more safely and quickly via public transport and bicycle and the time to reach the nearest health centers has decreased by about 30 minutes on project roads.

The government of Chhattisgarh, acting through the CGPWD, was the executing agency. The project implementation unit, established in the CGPWD, was the implementing agency.

Social safeguard designs initially underestimated the resettlement impacts, omitted right-of-way compensation requirements, and proposed unsuitable mitigation measures such as voluntary land donations.  As a result, the project was non-compliant with social safeguards requirements for 26 months.  Safeguards implementation came into better shape, following the reconduct of detailed measurement survey of losses and execution of a resettlement corrective action plan in 2018. Although some issues remained pending as of project physical completion in 2019, these were eventually resolved with the resumption of discussions between ADB and the EA in 2020.  The experience highlights the importance of an accurate assessment of potential impacts and EA/IA safeguards capacity and EA/IA training and capacity building to ensure proper safeguards design and implementation.  Context-sensitive issues such as the suitability of voluntary land donations, should be carefully weighed and agreed with the EAs/IAs at the early stage of project implementation.

The ADB grant-financed module 1 was completed more than two years ahead of the KEXIM loan-financed modules 2 and 3. However, because of the interdependence of the three transmission modules, module 1 cannot be operationalized without the completion of modules 1 and 2. The risk of procurement and implementation delays in the co-financed components should have been considered in the project design. When project components can be made technically independent, this option should be used to avoid delayed benefits. 

Cost overruns initially led to the removal of one transmission line, but a shorter line was added once it was confirmed it could be completed using the project’s available financing envelope. These overruns were caused mainly by higher than envisaged materials costs.  For example, between 2009 and 2011 copper prices increased by about 54%, aluminum by about 44%, and steel by about 30%.  The overruns could have been mitigated by a thorough assessment of the relevant international market conditions and the incorporation of results into the project cost estimates.

The project had two turnkey contracts procured through international competitive bidding: (i) an ADB-financed $12.6 million contract, open to contractors from all ADB member countries, and (ii) the KEXIM-financed $34.82 million contract, open only to contractors from Korea. The ADB-financed contract, once awarded, was implemented smoothly. However, the KEXIM-financed contract encountered difficulties to the contractor’s limited experience in the Lao PDR, which caused delays in conducting surveys, fine-tuning technical designs, obtaining various approvals, and preparing the contractor environmental management plan.

Extended five times, the completion of this project was 5.5-year behind schedule. Delays occurred because of low project readiness and weak procurement capacity of the executing agency. As a result, against the procurement plan to award all transmission works contracts in quarter 4 of 2012, the ADB-financed contract for module 1 was awarded in quarter 2 of 2014 while the contracts for modules 2 and 3 financed by the government of Korea through the Korean Export and Import (KEXIM) Bank was awarded in quarter 2 of 2016.  Contract awards could have been accelerated if the project was design or procurement ready at approval.  In future, ADB and the government should identify and mobilize adequate resources to prepare detailed engineering designs and corresponding safeguards documents to launch procurement as early as possible.

At project appraisal in 2009, 60% of households in the Phongsali province and 50% in the Xaignabouli province of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) were poor. Only 39% of the households in these two project provinces had access to electricity. Lack of access to grid electricity was a major constraint on government efforts to reduce poverty.

To help address the situation, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a grant of $20 million for the Greater Mekong Subregion Northern Power Transmission Project in January 2010.  The government of the Republic of Korea also approved a $37.88 million loan for the project as parallel cofinancing through the Export–Import Bank of Korea (KEXIM).

At the impact level, the project sought to contribute to achieving the government’s goal of rural electrification by 2020.  Its expected outcome was increased access to electricity for households in the northern provinces of Lao PDR. The anticipated impact and outcome were to be achieved through four outputs: (i) physical infrastructure ─ new 115 kilovolt (kV) transmission lines constructed and operating; new substations constructed, and existing substations expanded and operating; 22 kV feeder lines and low voltage distribution networks in Phongsali, Xaignabouli, and Vientiane provinces built and ready for use; (ii) provision of connections to poor households through no-interest credit of KN700,000 per household; (iii) a draft strategy framework on energy efficiency and renewable energies and national strategy for hydropower utilization; and (iv) increased access to a two-way power trade between Electricité du Laos (EDL) and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT).

Output 1 comprised three modules, with the ADB grant financing module 1 and the KEXIM loan financing modules 2 and 3.  The ADB grant also financed the project consulting services and credit scheme for poor households.

At completion, except for the 85.6 kilometer (km)- reduction in 115 kV transmission line length, all output 1 targets were achieved. However, the delays were significant. Module 1 was delayed by about 3 years. Modules 2 and 3 were completed in 2019 after a 6-year delay. Output 2 targets were exceeded but delayed by about 5 years.  By end-2019, 24,095 households, against the target of 18,800, were electrified, 8,832 of whom were poor.

Output 3 targets were achieved with a 5-year delay, with the draft strategy framework on energy efficiency and renewable energy prepared under the project incorporated into the final Prime Ministerial decree on energy efficiency and conservation policy frameworks.  Under output 4, the interconnection between Paklay and Thali was completed in 2019 and energized in April 2020, enabling power trade between EDL and EGAT. Data from December 2020 to March 2021 shows that about 28,120 megawatt-hours of power had been transmitted through the line per month, which is about 78 megawatts without considering the load factor, exceeding the output target of 28 MW of traded through the interconnection.

Substantial attainment of the output targets enabled the project to likewise achieve or even exceed its outcome and impact targets. As of 2019, 93% of villages and 94% of households in the Lao PDR were energized against targets of 80% and 90%, respectively. The provincial targets were also exceeded; 68% of households in Phongsali and 98% in Xaignabouli have been electrified.  By exceeding the target to provide no interest credit to poor households, majority of whom were ethnic minorities, the project has also been significantly impacting poverty reduction. 

The project had the EDL as executing agency.  A project management unit under the EDL coordinated the day-to-day project activities.

The project implemented an integrated model to agricultural productivity growth, combining infrastructure development with the institutional development of farmer organizations and capacity development of farmers. Strengthening of the farmer professional associations and water users’ associations has provided the institutional mechanism for farmers to take over the operation and maintenance responsibility for small project facilities, including applying the cost-recovery scheme with the user-pay principle.  Regular trainings to farmers in integrated pest management, soil testing and balanced fertilization application, water-saving technologies, and marketing, enhanced their productivity skills and capacities, making it more likely for income benefits to be sustained across time.  Along with the participatory approach to infrastructure management, continued income increases will foster the sustainability of the project. 

This project supported the comprehensive agricultural development (CAD) program of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) government to enhance national food security and employed a holistic approach to address common sector issues. It covered six provinces and 68 counties and consolidated county activities into provincial subprojects by applying a single integrated CAD model in all the counties. The project lending modality enabled the consolidation of the large number of activities scattered across six provinces into six provincial subprojects. However, it required the processing of an unusually large number of contracts (657), which was helped by the preparation and use of standardized bidding documents.  Reporting requirements, including on safeguards were streamlined, and an integrated management information system was set up at the State Office for Comprehensive Agricultural Development. Adoption of a uniform integrated model and streamlining of procurement and reporting processes proved instrumental in the project’s success.

The impact and outcome indicators identified in this project’s original design and monitoring framework, i.e., absolute increases in grain output and farm income at the impact level, and yield growth and irrigation water use efficiency at the outcome level, comprised results that were attributable to many factors other than the project.  While the comparison of indicators between the project and non-project areas in the provinces supported the positive impacts of the project, it was not possible to isolate the project’s impact from the other factors without baseline information and a precise definition of control group. In addition to well-defined indicators, future projects should also clearly define the baseline and control groups and monitor and assess impacts through periodic sample surveys to reliably evaluate their performance and contributions to changes across time and at project completion.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made impressive achievements in securing a stable food supply for the largest population in the world through substantial investments in agriculture and implementing institutional reforms. Nevertheless, food security remains a concern as the population is expected to reach about 1.46 billion in 2030. Feeding the growing population with a self-sufficiency rate above 95% required increasing grain production by 50 million tons between 2009 and 2020.

In November 2012, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a $200 million loan for the Comprehensive Agricultural Development Project, which aimed to enhance food security in the PRC by supporting the government’s comprehensive agricultural development (CAD) program. Five provinces (Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Jilin, and Yunnan) and one autonomous region (Ningxia Hui) were selected as the representative national food-surplus and food-balance regions. 

At appraisal, the project’s expected impact was enhanced food security in the PRC. Its intended outcome was increased agricultural productivity in the project area.  It was to deliver the outputs of: (i) improved irrigation and drainage infrastructure; (ii) improved agricultural support; and (iii) improved project management. At completion, the project substantially achieved its output and outcome targets.  

Under output 1, drainage was improved on 92,227 hectares (ha) of land (79% of the target), reducing the risk of waterlogging in the project area. Surface water irrigation was improved or developed on 72,769 ha (173% of the target) and groundwater irrigation on 32,754 ha (80% of the target), providing a reliable water supply for high-yielding grain production. Water-saving technology was introduced in 105,523 ha (142% of the target), improving the efficiency of irrigation water use. The operation and maintenance (O&M) of irrigation and drainage infrastructure was improved by forming or strengthening 33 water users’ associations (WUAs), 51% short of target, largely because some communities already had informal water user groups or formal administrative bodies that had the same capacity to collectively manage irrigation and drainage facilities as WUAs.

Under output 2, the project addressed the structural problem of soil degradation by improving the soil quality of 43,600 ha of land (65% of the target) through land leveling, soil testing, appropriate application of fertilizers, returning crop residue to farmland, and reducing salinity. Despite underachievement of the target, it expanded shelterbelt tree coverage to 3,069 ha and forests to 183 ha, and demonstrated sustainable agricultural production practice, which complementarily addressed the soil degradation problem.  Improvement in 1,966 kilometers of farm access roads (105% of target) and mechanized farming (113% of target) reduced labor inputs and increased market access. The project also established or strengthened 94 farmer professional associations (80% of the target) and sufficiently met the training needs in the project area

Under output 3, training and office equipment provided contributed to the successful and timely implementation of the extensive project. The integrated management information system allowed the national project management office (PMO) to consolidate the project data and monitor the project progress effectively.

Increased agricultural productivity and irrigation water use efficiency in the project area was thus consequently realized.  Between 2010 and 2018, grain yields rose by 53% (target 27%), cash crop yields (excluding vegetables) by 353% (target 27%), and vegetable yields by 35% (target 27%). Improved irrigation and drainage infrastructure, and institutional and human capacity building increased overall irrigation water use efficiency to 55% (target 45%) for surface water irrigation systems and 76% (target 75%) for groundwater irrigation systems. The project’s emphasis on gender equality has further improved its overall performance.

The State Office for Comprehensive Agricultural Development was the project executing agency.  It established a national PMO to coordinate day-to-day implementation, taken charge of by the governments of the participating counties and governments.

Eight civil works packages under national competitive bidding were procured successfully using Viet Nam's e-procurement system. All the e-procured packages achieved high efficiency with an average of 50 days end-to-end procurement time.  However, there were only one or two bids per package. This may be because of the new procurement procedure but may also reflect small contract values (less than $1 million per contract).

All the works contracts under this project were supervised by consulting engineers appointed to ensure that detailed engineering designs were followed, and contractors’ claims were legitimate. However, the supervision of some subprojects was insufficient to ensure timely completion and handover of fully operational, quality works. Of note were (i) a nonfunctioning pressurized piped irrigation system in Cu M’Gar, Dak Lak; and (ii) a poorly constructed irrigation system in Ea Soup, Dak Lak.  

During the completion review field visits, it was observed that irrigation facilities are better maintained than low-volume rural roads. This is because budget allocations to irrigation management companies provide for a minimum level of service and people are engaged on a part-time basis to maintain canals and keep gates in operating condition. In the case of low volume rural roads, not only are commune funds more limited than provincial sources, the institutional structure to maintain alignments is also inadequate.  As a result, commune people’s committees often engage voluntary groups (youth or women’s associations) to carry out basic maintenance and vegetation control at a scale that requires mechanical intervention.  Without a formal organization and institutional arrangement to do the job, the maintenance of rural roads is often left undone or done too late.

With the tremendous pressure on Viet Nam’s provincial administrations to achieve economic development, investments have tended to prioritize the expansion of PRI with designs that are often based on outdated standards and cost norms. Irrigation and road designs thus typically result in lower capacity with structural weaknesses, consequently requiring repair and/or upgrade shortly after commissioning.  For example, significant periodic maintenance was required for the subprojects in Buon Tria–Buon Triet communes of Lak district within just 2 years after commissioning.  However, due to the limited revenue generation capacity of provincial governments, it is not always possible to meet the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of the project assets.  Given this, it is of great importance that PRI design standards adequately address current risk factors, particularly under expected climate change scenarios and the changing land-use patterns.

The Productive Rural Infrastructure Sector Project in the Central Highlands, approved by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) for a loan of $77.68 million-equivalent in September 2013, aimed to regenerate and upgrade underdeveloped or outdated productive rural infrastructure (PRI) in Viet Nam.  It targeted areas with existing irrigation schemes that had good potential for agricultural production. PRI investments were to include irrigation and associated rural access infrastructure upgrades in the Central Highlands Provinces (CHPs) of Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Gia Lai, Kon Tum, and Lam Dong.

The project’s envisaged impact was increased rural incomes and sustained livelihoods in the participating CHPs. Its expected outcome was improved rural and agricultural productivity, to be achieved through the following planned outputs: (i) improved PRI; (ii) enhanced capacity to develop, manage, and use PRI; and (iii) efficient project management.  It was to have a positive impact on the lives and livelihoods of 3.75 million rural residents (71% of the CHP population, of which 34.3% were ethnic minorities and 22.4% were considered poor) by facilitating access to inputs (including irrigation water), markets, health services, education, and employment opportunities while reducing production and marketing costs.

Investments screened for inclusion were pre-identified in the participating provinces’ socioeconomic development plans and met the eligibility criteria agreed with the government. The 23 subprojects eventually selected (3 for phase 1, 12 for phase 2, and 8 for phase 3), consisted of irrigation facilities and associated rural roads to improve market access. Two of the subprojects, which employed piped delivery systems and water-efficient application technologies, were chosen for their demonstration value and replication potential in the CHPs, particularly in Lam Dong and Dak Lak where higher value annuals, perennials, and industrial crops abound but water resources remain limited.

At completion, the project achieved all its PRI output targets.  It rehabilitated and expanded 40 irrigation schemes, covering over 19,738 hectares (ha) of command area (revised target after the midterm review was 17,500 ha); and constructed or upgraded 254.4 kilometers (km) of  rural roads (target was 130 km).  Works contracts provided jobs to 2,583 local unskilled workers, 40.3% of whom were women.  Operation and maintenance plans have been in place for all irrigation subprojects and implemented by provincial irrigation management companies.   Completed rural roads have been transferred to commune councils and maintained by commune organizations.

The attainment of output 2 targets was mixed: of the 6 targets, 1 was not achieved, 3 were partially achieved, and 2 were achieved. Condition inventories were not established as planned. Project management and PRI users’ trainings and studies on improved PRI and irrigation scheme management were only partly achieved.  Achieved targets were on the number of training courses and participants in irrigation scheme management and on HIV/AIDs and road and dam awareness campaigns. All targets on output 3 were achieved, albeit with dela

The output deliveries enabled the project to substantially achieve its outcome targets. Crop yields for rice, coffee, and pepper increased and 390,370 people, against the target of 267,727, benefited from the improved rural roads. Overall, the project thus achieved its envisaged impact, contributing to reduced poverty among the direct beneficiaries (14.95% in 2012 to 6.81% in 2018) and increased average household income in the subproject areas (D20.2 million in 2018, up 53.5% from 2013).

The project had the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development as executing agency, and the provincial people’s committees of the participating CHPs as implementing agencies.

The project has been annually audited by independent external auditors. However, APFS covering only the physical implementation period may not capture all project-related expenses and loan disbursements.  To facilitate the reconciliation of ADB records with the APFS on which the auditors have provided a qualified opinion, financial auditing was continued until project financial closure.

Not all safeguards monitoring reports were submitted under this project and the ADB loan disbursement records and latest audited project financial statement (APFS) remained unreconciled at project completion review mission. These non-compliances may have been mitigated through the participation of safeguards and financial management staff in review missions.