The combination of programmatic policy-based assistance and TA support provided under this initiative proved to be effective and should be continued. The lack of qualified and experienced local consultants had been a recurring issue, and the Ministry of Health (MOH), the executing agency, continued to face a shortage of sanctioned staff. By giving consultant support to key departments of MOH, the TA contributed to knowledge transfer and capacity building for these departments, and to stronger coordination across the MOH and other ministries.
Effective implementation of system reforms, given their long-term horizon, requires phased support from development partners. The multiple tranche arrangement employed by this program ensured satisfactory progression as a precondition for continued ADB assistance and strengthened the government’s accountability for the reforms.
The policy actions pursued under this program were developed in an open, participatory manner. They were fully aligned with the country’s Health Sector Reform Strategy and Health Sector Development Plan. The participatory development and full alignment of the reform program with the country sector strategy and development plan ensured strong and broad ownership and commitment from the government, and with the assistance of development partners, strengthened policy dialogue and coordination.
Incorporating utility shifting as part of the item-rate contract proved to be effective in the timely delivery of projects in some states of India. In road construction projects, the task of utility shifting is usually contracted out to a third-party entity specialized in utility shifting. However, contractors often utilize or abuse this arrangement as an excuse to delay civil works. To prevent such an occurrence, it may be necessary for utility shifting to be included in the bill of quantity items to be carried out by the contractor.
Some of this project’s initial delays can also be attributed to the need to revise the DPRs because of discrepancies or deficiencies in design, specifications, and quantities. For example, mismatches in the number of culverts and bridges relative to site conditions were found during project implementation. Additional requirements, including four lanes in urban or habituated sections, were included late in the project, requiring the issuance of variations. Further, because a wildlife sanctuary clearance was not obtained, one road was dropped from the project. In future, EAs should ensure that DPRs are more meticulously prepared to accord with the site requirements. Also importantly, that the required environmental clearances are obtained during DPR preparation.
Following the request made by the state public works department through the national government of India, this project was prepared for approval well ahead of the schedule proposed in the country operations business plan. The construction supervision consultants were recruited under ADB’s advance action facility, about 10 months before the start of loan negotiations. However, grounding the project took longer than anticipated. The benefits of advance contracting could not be realized because the EA was short of staff to undertake procurement-related tasks, and contract awards started only in quarter 1 of 2015, or three years after loan approval. This undermined the advance action’s intention to facilitate timely startup and completion. Especially for sector loan projects with multiple subprojects and contracts, such as this one, it is important that EAs/IAs have an adequate number of skilled procurement staff to ensure project readiness at loan approval and maximize the benefits of advance action.
Social safeguard designs initially underestimated the resettlement impacts, omitted right-of-way compensation requirements, and proposed unsuitable mitigation measures such as voluntary land donations. As a result, the project was non-compliant with social safeguards requirements for 26 months. Safeguards implementation came into better shape, following the reconduct of detailed measurement survey of losses and execution of a resettlement corrective action plan in 2018. Although some issues remained pending as of project physical completion in 2019, these were eventually resolved with the resumption of discussions between ADB and the EA in 2020. The experience highlights the importance of an accurate assessment of potential impacts and EA/IA safeguards capacity and EA/IA training and capacity building to ensure proper safeguards design and implementation. Context-sensitive issues such as the suitability of voluntary land donations, should be carefully weighed and agreed with the EAs/IAs at the early stage of project implementation.
The ADB grant-financed module 1 was completed more than two years ahead of the KEXIM loan-financed modules 2 and 3. However, because of the interdependence of the three transmission modules, module 1 cannot be operationalized without the completion of modules 1 and 2. The risk of procurement and implementation delays in the co-financed components should have been considered in the project design. When project components can be made technically independent, this option should be used to avoid delayed benefits.
Cost overruns initially led to the removal of one transmission line, but a shorter line was added once it was confirmed it could be completed using the project’s available financing envelope. These overruns were caused mainly by higher than envisaged materials costs. For example, between 2009 and 2011 copper prices increased by about 54%, aluminum by about 44%, and steel by about 30%. The overruns could have been mitigated by a thorough assessment of the relevant international market conditions and the incorporation of results into the project cost estimates.
Extended five times, the completion of this project was 5.5-year behind schedule. Delays occurred because of low project readiness and weak procurement capacity of the executing agency. As a result, against the procurement plan to award all transmission works contracts in quarter 4 of 2012, the ADB-financed contract for module 1 was awarded in quarter 2 of 2014 while the contracts for modules 2 and 3 financed by the government of Korea through the Korean Export and Import (KEXIM) Bank was awarded in quarter 2 of 2016. Contract awards could have been accelerated if the project was design or procurement ready at approval. In future, ADB and the government should identify and mobilize adequate resources to prepare detailed engineering designs and corresponding safeguards documents to launch procurement as early as possible.
The project implemented an integrated model to agricultural productivity growth, combining infrastructure development with the institutional development of farmer organizations and capacity development of farmers. Strengthening of the farmer professional associations and water users’ associations has provided the institutional mechanism for farmers to take over the operation and maintenance responsibility for small project facilities, including applying the cost-recovery scheme with the user-pay principle. Regular trainings to farmers in integrated pest management, soil testing and balanced fertilization application, water-saving technologies, and marketing, enhanced their productivity skills and capacities, making it more likely for income benefits to be sustained across time. Along with the participatory approach to infrastructure management, continued income increases will foster the sustainability of the project.
This project supported the comprehensive agricultural development (CAD) program of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) government to enhance national food security and employed a holistic approach to address common sector issues. It covered six provinces and 68 counties and consolidated county activities into provincial subprojects by applying a single integrated CAD model in all the counties. The project lending modality enabled the consolidation of the large number of activities scattered across six provinces into six provincial subprojects. However, it required the processing of an unusually large number of contracts (657), which was helped by the preparation and use of standardized bidding documents. Reporting requirements, including on safeguards were streamlined, and an integrated management information system was set up at the State Office for Comprehensive Agricultural Development. Adoption of a uniform integrated model and streamlining of procurement and reporting processes proved instrumental in the project’s success.
The impact and outcome indicators identified in this project’s original design and monitoring framework, i.e., absolute increases in grain output and farm income at the impact level, and yield growth and irrigation water use efficiency at the outcome level, comprised results that were attributable to many factors other than the project. While the comparison of indicators between the project and non-project areas in the provinces supported the positive impacts of the project, it was not possible to isolate the project’s impact from the other factors without baseline information and a precise definition of control group. In addition to well-defined indicators, future projects should also clearly define the baseline and control groups and monitor and assess impacts through periodic sample surveys to reliably evaluate their performance and contributions to changes across time and at project completion.
During the completion review field visits, it was observed that irrigation facilities are better maintained than low-volume rural roads. This is because budget allocations to irrigation management companies provide for a minimum level of service and people are engaged on a part-time basis to maintain canals and keep gates in operating condition. In the case of low volume rural roads, not only are commune funds more limited than provincial sources, the institutional structure to maintain alignments is also inadequate. As a result, commune people’s committees often engage voluntary groups (youth or women’s associations) to carry out basic maintenance and vegetation control at a scale that requires mechanical intervention. Without a formal organization and institutional arrangement to do the job, the maintenance of rural roads is often left undone or done too late.
With the tremendous pressure on Viet Nam’s provincial administrations to achieve economic development, investments have tended to prioritize the expansion of PRI with designs that are often based on outdated standards and cost norms. Irrigation and road designs thus typically result in lower capacity with structural weaknesses, consequently requiring repair and/or upgrade shortly after commissioning. For example, significant periodic maintenance was required for the subprojects in Buon Tria–Buon Triet communes of Lak district within just 2 years after commissioning. However, due to the limited revenue generation capacity of provincial governments, it is not always possible to meet the operation and maintenance (O&M) costs of the project assets. Given this, it is of great importance that PRI design standards adequately address current risk factors, particularly under expected climate change scenarios and the changing land-use patterns.
Since some of the capacity building-related components under output 2 were linked to the transmission line and substation components under output 1, no separate arrangements for consultant engagement were made for output 2. With the project management unit (PMU) focusing on output 1, the two output 1-related capacity building activities were implemented. The others were not also due to the changed needs during implementation, but this was not brought to ADB’s attention. In the absence of consultants, the EA should have included staff from relevant divisions in the PMU to at least help in output 2 progress reporting.
Many public resource reforms, especially those relating to taxes or concessions as in the SPBL, have political and economic implications and are often difficult to undertake without strong ownership. The SPBL implementation success is attributable to (i) a good understanding of the vested interests, (ii) the institutional capacity of government agencies, (iii) effective partnership and coordination between ADB and the government, and (iv) a strong sense of appreciation for the overall benefits of the program.
This special policy-based loan (SPBL) was developed in close consultation with the government and development partners, including the International Monetary Bank and the World Bank, and was designed through a holistic approach. The experience demonstrated that a comprehensive and holistic consultation process can ensure effective diagnosis of the issues, leading to a strong, relevant policy matrix that prioritizes reform measures and sets realistic timelines in collaboration with the development partners.
While the key urban sector and executing agency for this project, the Ministry of Urban Development (MUOD), adopted a structure for GESI mainstreaming with separate budget head, this initiative faced challenges after the country’s administrative restructuring. There were no division offices and GESI units in the districts, and the sociologist’s position that used to support GESI activities was removed from the departments. Nevertheless, using the resource materials developed under this project as guide, the GESI-trained staff in the divisions can push for establishing and institutionalizing GESI in the new structure of the provinces and at the local level. This would require revising MOUD’s GESI operational guidelines 2013 to define the roles and responsibilities in all tiers of government.
Part of the project’s design innovation is the construction of modern SLS. The Nepalgunj SLS construction was successful due to continuous community engagement, cooperation among political leaders, and early implementation of a community development program targeted at communities living near the SLS. However, the SLSs in Janakpur and Siddharthanagar had to be dropped, as nearby communities did not agree to their construction. Due to haphazard operation of existing SLSs and dumping sites, there is a growing “not in my backyard” syndrome in these communities towards SWM facilities. Discord among local political leaders, inadequate coordination at inter-local level, and political misunderstanding disrupted stakeholder engagement and contributed to the two sites’ cancellation.
The initial design of this project was delayed and required modifications during implementation mainly due to the unavailability of information on existing underground utilities such as by plan profile and as-built drawings. Final designs were likewise not always comprehensive, necessitating variations for most contracts, resulting in both startup delays and contract modifications. In future, ADB should ensure that the scope of work of design consultants for urban development projects include an assessment of all existing utilities, including those underground. Also, that the consultants make every effort to meet their deliverables, comply with the agreed schedules and contract obligations, and respond to requests from client governments and ADB.
The number of overhead water supply tanks built under the project was reduced from 10 to 8 because of poor contractor performance. But the outcome target of augmenting potable water supply by 23.5 million liters per day (MLD) was substantially achieved and reached 20 MLD with the installation of 19 tube wells and by replacing more pumps and other electro-mechanical equipment than targeted (148 actual against the 112 target). The adjustments also resulted in an additional 10,200 people in low-income or poor households (against the target of 3,800) benefiting from the increase in water supply. These accomplishments demonstrate how being outcome-oriented could lead to better results. Nevertheless, the design could have considered incorporating more comprehensive solutions, such as 24x7 water supply with O&M arrangements, into construction contracts. This would have maximized the benefits from the improved water supply systems and enhanced the sustainability of both the project benefits and assets.
The recruitment of a new project management consultant (PMC) and a new design and construction supervision consultant (DSC) for the MFF, although late, worked favorably for this project. The new PMC and DSC performed substantially better than their predecessors. However, the delivery of their services was hampered by site constraints, design changes, and delays in finalizing the drawings. In future, a realistic timeframe for consultant recruitment, detailed design development, and civil works contracts, should be ensured during loan preparation and appraisal.
The financial sustainability analysis conducted at MFF completion showed that there are enough state operating receipts to meet the O&M expenses of the project facilities. Given that the operating institutions did not achieve recovery of the O&M costs as envisaged at appraisal, fiscal transfers from the state and central governments need to continue to ensure the sustainability of the project assets.
The project’s target to have the municipalities adopt the accrual-based accounting system and publish their balance sheets from fiscal year 2015 were only partly achieved. The target to have semi-autonomous water supply entities prepare and adopt organizational development plans was achieved but with delay. So was the target to install a more efficient water billing and collection system that materialized only post-project completion. Therefore, it became evident that the reform targets were rather ambitious considering the state’s limited capacity and the local context, including frequent local unrest, which required a longer implementation period.